Insurance Law by Krebs, Arno W., Jr. & Denny, Otway B., Jr.
SMU Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 9
1981
Insurance Law
Arno W. Krebs Jr.
Otway B. Denny Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Arno W Krebs, Jr. *
and
Otway B. Denny, Jr.**
I. LIABILITY INSURANCE
Personal Injury Protection Coverage. One case was decided during the
past year interpreting the scope of personal injury protection coverage.
Flores v. Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co.' dealt with the need for a
causal relationship between the vehicle and the accident for which recov-
ery was sought. Flores had a family automobile liability policy that pro-
vided personal injury protection coverage pursuant to article 5.06-3 of
the Texas Insurance Code.2 The accident made the basis of this suit oc-
curred when Flores tripped and fell on a curb in a parking lot four steps
from his parked car. Article 5.06-3 provides personal injury protection
coverage for reasonable expenses arising from an accident and "arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle."' 3 The Flores
court stated that under article 5.06-3 it was necessary for a causal rela-
tionship to exist between the vehicle and the accident before recovery
could be had under the policy.4 As the facts in the instant case clearly
established no such relationship, the court denied plaintiff's recovery. 5
Uninsured Motorist Coverage. The only case involving uninsured motor-
ist coverage, French v. Insurance Co. of North America,6 dealt with the
retroactive effect of a 1977 amendment to the Texas Insurance Code that
includes property damage coverage within uninsured motorist coverage.7
Prior to the amendment, coverage for property damage caused by unin-
sured motorists was not required by statute. The amendment, effective
August 29, 1977, requires that coverage for such property damage be in-
cluded in all policies issued after its effective date.8
In French the insurer issued a policy of insurance to the insured prior to
r B.A., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Ful-
bright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
** B.A., Texas A&M University; J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Fulbright
& Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. 595 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
2. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980).
3. Id. art. 5.06-3(a).
4. 595 S.W.2d at 895.
5. Id.
6. 591 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
7. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 182, § 1, at 370 (codified at TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
5.06-1 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980)).
8. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980).
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the effective date of the amendment. Subsequent to the date of the amend-
ment, an additional vehicle was added to the insured's policy by an
amended declaration. This vehicle later collided with an uninsured motor
vehicle, and the insured demanded payment from the insurer for the prop-
erty damage. The insurer refused payment on the basis that the policy was
issued prior to the effective date of the amendment; therefore, the insurer
argued, the amended declaration did not include coverage for property
damage to the vehicle in question. 9 The insured contended that coverage
for the additional vehicle constituted a separate and distinct policy issued
subsequent to the effective date of the amendment.10 The court held for
the insurer, stating the general rule that a rider attached to an insurance
policy merges into the policy to which it is attached. I" The court reasoned
that because the amended declaration did not create a new policy of insur-
ance, it would be contrary to article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution
to hold that the amended uninsured motorist statute imposed a new duty
upon the parties.' 2 The court also pointed out that the legislature was
aware of the language necessary to provide for the application of the
amendment to endorsements or riders to insurance policies.' 3 The court
stated that the fact that this language was not used was evidence that the
legislature intended not to provide for such coverage.' 4
Conditions. During the survey period, a Texas court again addressed the
responsibility of the insured to forward suit papers to his insurer. In
Wheeler v. Allstate Insurance Co. 15 the insured failed to forward suit pa-
pers to his insurer until after a default judgment had been rendered against
him in a suit by a third party. The policy in question had been issued prior
to the effective date of the state Insurance Board's Endorsement 158L,
under which coverage continues in the absence of prejudice to the com-
pany due to the insured's failure to comply with the notice or suit-paper
provisions. ' 6 Consequently, the court held that Endorsement 158L did not
apply to the instant case. 17 In a dictum the court stated that because a
default judgment had been entered against the insured, it would be diffi-
cult to imagine more prejudice to the insurance company, which had no
9. 591 S.W.2d at 621.
10. Id.
I1. Id; see Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Manning, 362 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1962, no writ). The rider is thus considered a part of the insurance contract with
which it merges. See Dunn v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 287 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. 591 S.W.2d at 622; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16 (prohibits both retroactive laws and
laws impairing the obligation of contract).
13. The court cited TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.35A (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980),
in which the legislature explicitly provided that the article would apply to all policies, in-
cluding those that were modified, altered, or reissued after the effective date of the statute.
591 S.W.2d at 622.
14. 591 S.W.2d at 622.
15. 592 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
16. Id. at 3; see Krebs, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 289,
291-92 nn.17 & 20 (1980), for a discussion of this endorsement.
17. 592 S.W.2d at 3.
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knowledge of the lawsuit until the time for appeal had expired. ' 8 Addi-
tionally, this lack of notice served as the basis for the court's holding that
the insurance company was not estopped to raise the defense of failure to
forward suit papers.' 9 The court concluded that the insurer had no liabil-
ity under the policy because the insured had not given notice to his in-
surer.
20
In Thoede v. International Service Insurance Co. 2 1 the question before
the court involved the no-action clause in an automobile insurance pol-
icy. 22 Under the advice of his insurance agent, Thoede insured one vehicle
on his personal liability policy with International, while insuring all other
vehicles under a policy with Aetna. The former vehicle was involved in a
collision. Thoede, sued by the other driver, counterclaimed against both
insurance companies for covered amounts that he might have to pay to the
plaintiff, as well as against the agent for failing to provide coverage if none
existed. The trial court held that no coverage existed under either policy
and rendered judgment against the agent for damages. 23 Both the agent
and the insured appealed.
On appeal, International contended that, even if coverage were found, it
should not be liable on the policy due to the insured's violation of the no-
action clause. International claimed that there had been no "actual trial"
between Thoede and the other driver as required by the no-action clause
because the trial was a mere sham. The court, however, held that an actual
trial was not necessary in view of the facts and circumstances of the case.
24
The court reasoned that because International had denied coverage and
repeatedly refused to settle, it had effectively repudiated the policy and,
therefore, the insureds were no longer required to comply with the policy
provision requiring an actual trial. 25 To hold otherwise would discourage
settlements by forcing the insured to try a case in which it was subse-
quently determined that the insurance company had wrongfully refused to
defend.26 On this ground the court found International liable for the max-
imum amount of the policy plus attorney's fees and court costs.
27
In Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson 28 the court
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.
21. 600 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
22. This clause provided:
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy,
nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally
determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by writ-
ten agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.
Id. at 391.
23. Id. at 390.
24. Id. at 391.
25. Id; see Gulf Ins. Co. v. Parker Prods., Inc., 498 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1973).
26. The only question in such cases, therefore, is whether the settlement was reasonable;
this issue had been stipulated in the instant case. 600 S.W.2d at 391.
27. Id.
28. 601 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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decided the question of the effectiveness of a reservation of rights letter
and a waiver of noncoverage. The insurance company had issued an in-
surance policy to Bertha Wilkinson, covering an automobile she had
purchased for her son. Subsequently, the automobile was sold and a pick-
up was purchased in its place. The son, while driving the pickup, was
involved in an automobile accident with Sharyle Garza. The accident was
timely reported to the insurance company, which investigated the matter.
Four days after the collision the insurer paid Garza for damages to her
vehicle, but Garza also demanded that the insurer pay her for personal
injuries. Attorneys for the parties negotiated a settlement for over two
years. No settlement was reached, however, and suit was filed by Garza
against Wilkinson in January 1975. On July 11, 1977, the insurer brought
this action for a declaratory judgment, alleging that it had no obligation to
defend Wilkinson's son because he was not a named insured under the
policy issued to his mother and his pickup truck was not an insured vehi-
cle. On July 26, the branch claims manager for the insurer sent two letters
to Wilkinson's son. One stated that the Garza claim had been turned over
to its attorneys, who would unqualifiedly defend and protect his interests.
The other letter was a form reservation of rights notice that stated that
while the insurer would defend Wilkinson, it withheld the right to assert
the defense of noncoverage.
At trial, the insurance company contended that there was no coverage
under the policy, and that because there was no coverage, the action in
assuming the defense of Wilkinson could not operate as a waiver or estop-
pel to provide coverage.29 The trial court, based on jury findings, found
that coverage existed and that the insurer had a duty to defend. 30 On ap-
peal the court stated that although, as a general rule, estoppel may operate
to void conditions of a policy that would cause noncoverage, an estoppel
cannot change, rewrite, or enlarge the risk covered by the policy.31 Fur-
ther, the court noted that if an insurer assumes a defense with knowledge
of facts indicating noncoverage, and without first obtaining a reservation
of rights or nonwaiver agreement, all policy defenses, including those of
noncoverage, are waived and the insurer is estopped from asserting the
same. 32 Accordingly, the court held that because the insurer had assumed
the defense with knowledge of the facts, coverage existed absent an effec-
tive reservation of rights or nonwaiver agreement.33
The court found no such reservation or agreement in the instant case.
The two letters taken together expressed an ambiguous reservation of
29. Id. at 521.
30. Id.
31. Id; see Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Morse, 487 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. 1972).
32. 601 S.W.2d at 521-22; see Ferris v. Southern Underwriters, 109 S.W.2d 223, 226
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, writ ref'd). This rule is based on the apparent conflict of
interest that might arise when the insurer represents the insured in a lawsuit and simultane-
ously formulates a defense of noncoverage against the insured. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Acel
Delivery Serv., Inc., 485 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. 601 S.W.2d at 522.
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rights. 34 Construing the letters strictly against the insurer and liberally in
favor of the insured, the court interpreted them as extending to Wilkinson
an unconditional defense of the pending action.35
Coverage. Gulf Insurance Co. v. Bobo36 was one of two cases decided by
the Texas Supreme Court during this survey period that involved permis-
sive use. Bobo dealt with the liability of an insurer on a policy of automo-
bile liability insurance covering a vehicle that had been delivered to a
buyer but for which the buyer had not yet paid. William Avett, the in-
sured, agreed to sell his truck to David Havens, who took delivery of the
vehicle prior to completion of the sale. Havens had an accident in the
vehicle before the sale was completed. Two women injured by the acci-
dent brought suit against the seller's insurer. The court of civil appeals
held that if there is a named insured in the policy, anyone using the vehicle
described in the policy with the named insured's explicit or tacit consent is
an additional insured.37
The supreme court, however, reversed, holding that Havens acquired
the right to possession and the power to control the use of the vehicle when
he agreed to the terms of the sale.3 8 Therefore, the court reasoned, when
the accident occurred, Havens was not driving with Avett's permission be-
cause he did not need anyone's permission to drive his own vehicle. 39 The
court stated that, as a matter of law, a seller has no authority to grant his
conditional vendee permission to drive the vehicle.40 The court noted that
because the vehicle was no longer owned by the insured he could not give
or withhold his permission to the conditional vendee regarding use of the
automobile; rather, the court pointed out, the vendor, by retaining title to
the car until the purchase price is fully paid, does so only for security rea-
sons.4' The court concluded that Havens was not an additional insured
under Avett's policy, and the parties injured in the accident were denied
recovery.42
The second case, Coronado v. Employers' National Insurance CO., 4 3 in-
volved implied permission for the use of a vehicle and signaled the adop-
tion of the minor deviation rule44 in Texas. Sotello, an employee for
White Well Service, was instructed to drive his crew in a company pickup
from the company yard in Wickett to Monahans, where the crew lived. In
disregard of company rules they stopped at two bars for drinks. After mid-
34. Id. at 523.
35. Id.
36. 595 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. 1980).
37. 580 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979). For a discussion of the
court of civil appeals' opinion, see Krebs, supra note 16, at 298-99.
38. 595 S.W.2d at 848.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 848-49.
42. ld. at 849.
43. 596 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1980).
44. See notes 47-50 infra and accompanying text.
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night Sotello left the second bar in the pickup and was involved in a colli-
sion that resulted in the death of another motorist. The motorist's widow
recovered judgment against Sotello and then brought suit against White
Well Service's automobile liability insurer, Employers' National, to collect
the judgment.
After a jury trial, the court rendered judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict for the carrier, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.45 The supreme
court also affirmed, stating that the employer clearly had not granted
Sotello express permission to use the vehicle on the occasion in question;
thus, the question was whether Sotello had implied permission for such use
by his employer's acquiescence or lack of objection to similar prior use.46
The court examined three different approaches to the problem of deviation
that have been used by courts throughout the United States: the strict rule;
the liberal rule; and the minor deviation rule.47 Under the minor deviation
rule, which was adopted by the court, insurance protection exists so long as
the actual use of the vehicle is not a material or gross violation of the terms
of the initial permission. Under this rule the court must determine in each
instance the extent of the deviation in actual distance and time, the pur-
poses for which the vehicle was entrusted to the operator, and other rele-
vant factors such as frequency of use and the relationships between the
parties.48 The court stated that in the instant case the eight-hour deviation
was so gross as to be a material deviation as a matter of law.49 The court
reasoned that the use of the vehicle at the time of the accident was so far
outside the scope of the permission granted to Sotello that no fact issue
was raised that his employer had impliedly consented to such use.50
In United Services Automobile Association v. Stevens 51 the insurer
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of its lia-
bility under the omnibus clause of an automobile insurance policy. The
personal injury plaintiff received injuries when she was struck by a vehicle
owned by Thomas, the named insured, while it was being driven by Debra
Stevens and occupied by her father, William Stevens. Thomas had left the
vehicle with a friend, Crump, who undertook to sell it for a commission.
Crump had Thomas's permission to allow prospective purchasers to drive
the vehicle. Stevens, an employee of Crump, told Crump he was interested
in the vehicle and wanted to show it to his daughter. There was no discus-
sion as to whether his daughter, an unlicensed driver, could operate the
vehicle. The accident in question occurred while Stevens was sitting in the
45. 577 S.W.2d 525, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979). For a discussion of the court
of civil appeals' opinion, see Krebs, supra note 16, at 299.
46. 596 S.W.2d at 504.
47. Id. Under the strict rule, the actual use at the time of the accident must be within
the specified geographical area and the time limits contemplated by the parties for there to
be permissive use. Under the liberal rule, coverage is extended as long as the vehicle was
originally entrusted by the insured to the person operating it at the time of the accident. Id.
48. Id. at 504-05.
49. Id. at 506.
50. Id.
51. 596 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
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front seat and his daughter was operating the vehicle. The trial court
found this use of the vehicle to be within the permissive use provisions of
the policy and concluded that coverage existed. 52
On appeal the court noted that Thomas clearly expected Crump to show
the vehicle to prospective purchasers and that he expected such parties to
drive the vehicle. 53 Because Stevens and his daughter were prospective
purchasers, and because Debra Stevens was operating the vehicle with her
father seated in the front seat, the court found ample evidence to support
the finding that Stevens and his daughter were using the vehicle with the
implied consent of Thomas.54 The court dismissed the insurer's argument
that the implied permission for William Stevens to use the vehicle was
nondelegable to his daughter, an unlicensed driver.5 5 The insurer cited the
general rule that permission to use a vehicle, given by the named insured
to another, does not authorize such other person, the permittee, to allow a
third party to use the vehicle.56 The court, however, noted that this gen-
eral rule is not without exception: recovery is not precluded when the orig-
inal permittee is riding in the car with the second permittee at the time of
the accident or when the second permittee, while using the vehicle, is serv-
ing the purpose of the original permittee. 7 The court held that the instant
case fell within both exceptions to the general rule.58 The court further
noted that, in the absence of an express policy provision excluding liability
on the part of the insurer, the fact that a driver is unlicensed ordinarily is
not decisive on the question of omnibus clause coverage when the automo-
bile accident occurs while the insured automobile is being used by a third
person with the consent of the named insured's original permittee.59
Under the terms of this policy an unlicensed driver was not excluded from
coverage, and the court noted that no Texas case had ever excluded an
unlicensed driver from coverage when the policy failed to do so. 60
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,61 a
case of first impression in Texas, involved the responsibilities of an auto-
mobile liability insurer and an excess carrier under the "other insurance"
clauses of their respective policies. This suit arose out of an accident that
resulted in injuries to a passenger in a Jeep being driven by Steve Kennedy
52. Id. at 956.
53. Id. at 959.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 960.
56. Id. at 959.
57. Id. It is generally reasoned that under such circumstances the second permittee
presumably is operating the vehicle for the use of the first permittee and is thus within the
coverage of the omnibus clause. Id; see Travelers Indem. Co. v. Employers Cas. Co., 474
S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ); Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 454 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
58. 596 S.W.2d at 959.
59. Id. at 959-60; see Hays v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Ill. 2d 601, 192 N.E.2d 855
(1963); Wood v. Kok, 58 Wash. 2d 12, 360 P.2d 576 (1961).
60. 596 S.W.2d at 960.
61. 590 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1981l
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and owned by Henry Taub. The passenger's personal injury claim was
settled for $250,000. Kennedy was insured by Liberty Mutual with policy
limits of $100,000. Taub was insured by American General Insurance
Company under a family automobile policy with limits of $100,000 and by
United States Fire Insurance Company with a professional comprehensive
catastrophe liability policy, commonly referred to as an umbrella policy,
with limits of $1,000,000 in excess of the insured's "retained limit." By the
terms of Taub's automobile insurance policy it was clear that American
General's coverage was primary and that its limits were exhausted, leaving
a question as to the order of coverages between Liberty Mutual and
United States Fire. Liberty's policy contained a standard "other insur-
ance" clause, which provided that with respect to a nonowned vehicle it
"shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insur-
ance."' 62 United States Fire's policy provided that it would pay for the
ultimate net loss in excess of the retained limit of the underlying policies
listed in Schedule A of the policy and of "the applicable limits of any other
underlying insurance collectible by the insured. ' 63 Schedule A listed the
American General policy. The other insurance clause of the United States
Fire policy provided that if other insurance is available to the named in-
sured "the insurance hereunder shall be in excess of, and not contribute
with, such other insurance."'64
Liberty contended that the other insurance clauses of the policies were
mutually repugnant and thus should be construed to provide a concurrent
second layer of insurance on a pro rata basis based upon the respective
policy limits. 65 In support of its position Liberty relied upon Hardware
Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,66
wherein the Texas Supreme Court held two primary insurers liable on a
pro rata basis because the other insurance clauses were mutually repug-
nant.67 The court, however, distinguished Hardware Dealers on the
ground that both of the policies involved in that case were primary policies
and one of them contained an escape clause.68 In the instant situation, the
court added, courts should look to the overall pattern of insurance cover-
age to resolve the dispute between carriers.69 Although the other insur-
ance clause of each policy limited coverage in the presence of other validly
existing coverage, the court examined the purposes of the policies and
found that they dictated a resolution of the dispute.70 Liberty's policy af-
forded primary coverage and was excess only in the presence of a nonown-
62. Id. at 784.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 785.
65. Id.
66. 444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969).
67. Id. at 590.
68. 590 S.W.2d at 785.
69. Id; see Berkeley v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 407 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1975);
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 164 N.J. Super. 184, 395
A.2d 923 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
70. 590 S.W.2d at 785.
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ed vehicle. United States Fire's policy, on the other hand, remained excess
in all events and was intended as an umbrella policy.7' Thus, the court of
civil appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that Liberty be required to
pay its full policy limits before United States Fire Insurance incurred any
obligation. 72
In Martindale Lumber Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.73 the Fifth Cir-
cuit interpreted the completed operations74 and products hazard exclu-
sions75 in a general liability policy. Bituminous had refused to defend
Martindale, and Martindale brought suit to determine the insurer's obliga-
tion to pay a tort claim asserted against Martindale by the injured party.
The original suit resulted in a settlement between the injured party, Gray,
and Martindale. The basis of Gray's suit against Martindale was its al-
leged failure to band a load of lumber loaded by Martindale employees at
its plant onto a truck and trailer operated by Gray. As a consequence of
71. Id.; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 445 F.2d 1278 (5th
Cir. 1971); Aetna Ins. Co. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
72. 590 S.W.2d at 785.
73. 625 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. The completed operations hazard exclusion in a standard general liability insurance
policy provides:
"[C]ompleted operations hazard" includes bodily injury and property damage
arising out of operations or reliance upon a representation or warranty made
at any time with respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury or property dam-
age occurs after such operations have been completed or abandoned and
occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the named insured. "Oper-
ations" include materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection there-
with. Operations shall be deemed completed at the earliest of the following
times:(1) when all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the named in-
sured under the contract have been completed,
(2) when all operations to be performed by or on behalf of the named in-
sured at the site of the operations have been completed, or
(3) when the portion of the work out of which the injury or damage-arises
has been put to its intended use by any person or organization other than
another contractor or subcontractor engaged in performing operations
for a principal as a part of the same project.
Operations which may require further service or maintenance work, or cor-
rection, repair or replacement because of any defect or deficiency, but which
are otherwise complete, shall be deemed completed.
The completed operations hazard does not include bodily injury or property
damage arising out of
(a) operations in connection with the transportation of property, unless the
bodily injury or property damage arises out of a condition in or on a
vehicle created by the loading or unloading thereof,
(b) the existence of tools, uninstalled equipment or abandoned or unused
materials, or
(c) operations for which the classification stated in the policy or in the com-
pany's manual specifies "including completed operations" . ...
75. The products hazard exclusion in a standard general liability insurance policy pro-
vides:
"[P]roducts hazard" includes bodily injury and property damage arising out of
the named insured's products or reliance upon a representation or warranty
made at any time with respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury or property
damage occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the named insured
and after physical possession of such products has been relinquished to others
1981]
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this failure, when Gray unchained the upper stacks at the premises of the
purchaser, the lumber fell and injured him. Gray was employed as a truck
driver by an independent contractor, Sears, who was retained and paid by
Martindale to deliver the lumber to the purchaser.
Bituminous contended that the accident and resulting injuries fell within
either or both the completed operations hazard exclusion and the products
hazard exclusion. The completed operations hazard provision excluded
from coverage injuries that occurred away from the insured's premises af-
ter the insured's operations had been completed. 76 Operations were con-
sidered completed when all the things to be performed by or on behalf of
the insured were completed, or when the portion of the work out of which
the injury or damage arose had been put to its intended use by any person
or organization other than another contractor or subcontractor engaged in
performing operations for the insured as a part of the same project. 77 The
products hazard exclusion provided that no coverage existed for damage
caused by the insured's products that occurred away from the insured's
premises if physical possession of such products had been relinquished to
others.78
In the instant case, Martindale had sold the lumber to Elkins and con-
tracted with Sears to deliver the lumber to the destination designated by
Elkins. The delivery costs were paid by Martindale, who in turn charged
Elkins the exact freight charges billed by Sears. The district court held,
therefore, that Sears's activities were primarily for Martindale and not for
Elkins because the seller's obligations included delivery through an in-
dependent contractor employed by him. 79 According to the court, such
delivery was no less a part of the seller's operations than delivery by Mar-
tindale's own employees.80 The court further held that the accident oc-
curred when the operation was not complete because Gray was injured as
he unchained the lumber preparatory to having Elkins's employees com-
mence unloading. 81 The court found the completed operations exclusion
inapplicable, because the accident occurred during the course of Martin-
dale's operations. 82
The products hazards exclusion was also held inapplicable because the
product had not been relinquished to others at the time of the accident.8 3
Bituminous contended that upon Martindale's relinquishing the lumber to
Sears's physical possession, it had been relinquished to others.8 4 The court
disagreed, noting that by an attached endorsement Martindale had ex-
pressly purchased coverage for bodily injury to an independent contractor
76. See note 74 supra.
77. Id.
78. See note 75 supra.
79. 625 F.2d at 621.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 622.
82. Id.




or to an employee of an independent contractor while such person was
engaged in operations including logging and lumbering. 85 The court held
that the temporary transfer of physical possession to one standing in place
of the insured in the performance of operations did not constitute a relin-
quishment of possession to others for purposes of invoking the products
hazard exclusion.86 Thus, the court reasoned that the products hazard ex-
clusion was inapplicable and coverage was provided under the policy. 87
In H. C Price Co. v. Compass Insurance Co.88 the court interpreted a
watercraft exclusion in a general liability policy. The accident occurred
when the deceased's boat struck a cable stretched across a bayou. The
cable was attached to a tree on one side of the bayou and to a winch lo-
cated on a flexifloat, a barge-like boat, on the other side of the bayou. The
flexifloat was owned by H.C. Price Company and was used to transport
equipment between worksites on opposite sides of the bayou. At the time
of the accident the flexifloat was against the shore with its ramp resting on
the ground. While the bulk of the craft was in the water, it was, as close to
the shore as was possible without being completely grounded. In the re-
sulting suit filed against the insured, H.C. Price, by the deceased's widow,
the insurance company contended that the watercraft exclusion in Price's
policy should be applied. This exclusion provided that coverage did not
extend to damages resulting from watercraft owned or operated by the in-
sured, but did extend to damages caused by watercraft while ashore on
premises owned by, rented to, or controlled by the insured. 89 The insur-
ance company agreed to defend under a reservation of rights letter. The
insured refused this defense, however, and defended the suit itself. The
action terminated in a settlement. This declaratory judgment action was
later brought by the insured to determine coverage.
The district court held that the previous federal court judgment was
binding upon the insurance company.90 According to the court, an insur-
ance company with notice of a suit and a duty to defend its insured is
bound by any judgment in that suit if it fails to defend; the insurance com-
pany cannot relitigate material fact issues in a later suit.91 The district




88. 483 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
89. The exclusion specifically provided:
This insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of
(1) any watercraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any in-
sured, or
(2) any other watercraft operated by any person in the course of his em-
ployment by any insured; but this exclusion does not apply to water-




91. Id. at 173-74; see Ridgeway v. Gulf Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978).
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the insured's control. Initially, the court stated that various dictionary def-
initions indicate that "ashore" may mean "on" or "to" the shore.92 Since
part of the flexifloat, the ramp, was on the shore and the flexifloat itself was
moored to the shore, the court found that the craft was ashore. Further,
the court held that the flexifloat was moored in an area controlled by
Price.93 The court added that Price had a contractual right to be on the
premises for the limited purpose of performing the contract. 94 Based on
the foregoing, the court held that coverage existed and that the insurance
company was responsible for the settlement amount, costs of defense, and
expenses, including attorneys' fees and interest. 95
II. PROPERTY INSURANCE
Stewart v. Vanguard Insurance Co.96 concerned the definition of the
term "logged" in an insurance policy covering an airplane. A Cessna 180
owned by Harvey Stewart crashed with Stewart in the left front seat and
Jerry Greak in the right front seat. At the time of the crash, Greak was the
pilot in command and was actively operating the controls. Mr. and Mrs.
Stewart, the insureds, brought this action against Vanguard, their insurer,
to recover for property damage and medical expenses under their policy.
The policy contained a provision requiring the pilot in command to have
logged ten hours as a pilot in command of a Cessna 180. 97 Greak lost his
log book in the crash, but was permitted to testify about entries in the
book. He testified that he had never made any record of any time as a
pilot in command of a Cessna 180. The testimony indicated, however, that
Greak had spent 9.1 to twelve hours as pilot in command of the plane.
After a jury trial, judgment was entered for the Stewarts, based on a find-
ing that Greak had logged at least ten hours as a pilot in command.
The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that Greak, as a matter of
law, had not logged the necessary ten hours as a pilot in command of a
Cessna 180.98 In affirming the appellate court the supreme court defined
92. The court noted that dictionaries have been used on other occasions to define the
ordinary meanings of words used in insurance policies. See Ramsay v. Maryland Am. Gen.
Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1976).
93. 483 F. Supp. at 175.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 603 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1980).
97. The applicable policy provision provided:
When the aircraft is operated while in motion, insurance will be effective only
when said operation is by a pilot designated below who is possessed of a cur-
rent and valid pilot certificate of the kind specified with appropriate ratings
and a current medical certificate, all as required by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration for the flight involved and who meets the additional requirement
set forth below:
A pilot approved by the Named Insured provided he possesses a private or
commercial pilot certificate and has logged at least 750 flying hours as pilot in
command which includes at least 50 hours in single engine aircraft equipped
with a conventional landing gear and 10 hours in Cessna 180 aircraft.
Id. at 761.
98. 593 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston lIst Dist.] 1979).
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the term "logged": "The common-sense meaning of the term is that a rec-
ord, however informal, is made of the event. . . . It is the record that
gives reliability to the required time." 99 The court held that since none of
Greak's hours in command had been recorded, there was no evidence that
he had logged ten hours in a Cessna 180 as a pilot in command prior to the
crash.' °° For that reason, the claim by the Stewarts was denied.' 0 '
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Republic National Life Insurance
Co. 102 a claim was made on a fidelity bond issued to protect the insured
against the fraudulent acts of its employees. One of Republic's employees
forged the payee signatures and altered the amounts payable on numerous
checks drawn on Republic's account. Most of these checks were paid.
Upon learning of the withdrawals, Republic filed a "partial proof of loss"
with its insurer for $12,948.71. A supplemental proof of loss was filed
showing the original face amount of the checks to be $13,692.84. Both
proofs stated the total loss to be $32,924.84. Republic claimed the
$13,692.84 figure and sent a letter stating that the supplemental proof of
loss "would be the final proof of loss." °103 The insurer paid the insured
$13,255.59, and Republic signed a release."14 The check recited that it was
in full and final settlement of any loss related to the employee involved in
this matter. Republic, however, later filed suit seeking $19,232, the differ-
ence between the original face amounts of the checks and the altered face
amounts.
The trial court rendered judgment for the insurer, and Republic ap-
pealed. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding that Republic had
neither released nor abandoned these claims because there was no consid-
eration for the release of the $19,232 claim. 10 5 The court reasoned that the
payment of an undisputed claim could not serve as consideration for the
release of a later one.1°6
In reversing, the supreme court noted that there was only a single claim
that Republic could pursue to recover under the fidelity bond. 0 7 At the
time the supplemental proof of loss was filed, the claim was undisputed in
part and disputed in part. 10 8 Thus, the court stated, the full extent of the
99. 603 S.W.2d at 762.
100. Id. at 763.
101. Id.
102. 602 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. 1980).
103. Id. at 529.
104. The release, signed by Republic on February 11, 1974, stated:
[Republic] does hereby forever release and discharge [United States Fire]
from and against any demand, claim, cause or causes of action whatsoever
under policy 606160 of [United States Fire] and arising out of the forgery and
dishonesty of [Republic's employee], which is described and set forth in the
Proof of Loss dated December 13, 1973 in which a claim of $13,692.84 is
made.
Id.
105. 589 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979).
106. Id. at 740.




insurer's liability was unknown. 10 9 According to the court, the payment of
that portion of the claim about which there was no dispute ($13,255.59)
provided valid consideration for a release of the remainder ($19,232).'10
Because the total liability of the insurer was uncertain, the check had the
notation "Final Settlement" on it, and a formal release was executed, Re-
public was held to have no cause of action."'
In Ortiz v. Great Southern Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 112 the insur-
ance company insured Ortiz's house against fire loss. No personalty was
insured. A fire damaged the Ortiz home and the company paid them
$4,000 for the damage. Ortiz then fied suit against a carpet company for
$4,000 damage to realty and $11,614 damage to personal property, alleging
that the fire was caused by the negligence of the carpet company. The
insurance company intervened, claiming subrogation up to the $4,000 it
had previously paid to Ortiz. Ortiz denied the company's right to subroga-
tion. Subsequently, however, all three parties entered into a settlement
whereby the carpet company paid $10,000 into the registry of the court.
The parties stipulated that Ortiz's damages were in excess of $15,000, and
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the company's right
to intervene for the $4,000. On appeal the court of civil appeals affirmed,
stating that the company was entitled to equitable subrogation.' 3
In reversing, the supreme court recognized the right of equitable subro-
gation to prevent the insured from receiving a double recovery. 14 In this
case, however, the court found no indication that the amount recovered
was to any extent a double recovery." 5 The court, relying on an early
case,"16 held that the insurer was not entitled to subrogation because the
insured's loss was in excess of the amounts recovered from the insurer and
the third party.' 17 The court stated that an insurer can recover only the
excess collected from the wrongdoer after the insured is fully compensated
for his loss, including the expenses of collection." 8 The court did recog-
nize that an insurer may recover that portion of a settlement that is in-
tended to reimburse the insured for damages to insured real property, less
the cost of collection; the insurance company, however, bears the burden
of establishing what portion of the settlement is attributable to real prop-
109. Id.
110. Id.
11I. Id. at 530.
112. 597 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1980).
113. 587 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979).
114. 597 S.W.2d at 343.
115. Id.
116. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 175 S.W. 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1915, no writ).
117. 597 S.W.2d at 343. See also Propeck v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 65 S.W.2d 390,
390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1933, no wnt) (neither subrogation nor set-off available to in-
surer if loss is in excess of amounts recovered from insurer and third party causing loss).
118. 597 S.W.2d at 343. In so stating, the court disapproved the holding of State Farm





Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Fraiman120 involved the recovery of
rental losses, interest on rental losses, damages and attorneys' fees due to
the insurer's breach of appraisal provisions contained in the policy. The
insured had a fire policy covering his apartment complex. Damages to the
complex were sustained as a result of two separate fires. The insurer failed
to pay amounts claimed for the property loss; therefore, the insured de-
manded that the loss be determined through appraisal, as provided for in
the policy. When the insurer refused, the insured brought a declaratory
judgment action. On appeal, it was held that the insured had the right to
enforce the appraisal provision of the insurance policy.12' Pursuant to that
judgment, the appraised losses were paid by the insurer.
Upon the subsequent trial of the loss of rentals claim, the insured was
awarded rental losses as well as expenses incurred because of the insurer's
breach of the appraisal policy provision. The court of civil appeals af-
firmed, holding that the damages sought by the insured were recoverable
due to the breach of the policy provision requiring appraisal.122 In so do-
ing, the court analogized the instant situation to a suit for breach of an
agreement to arbitrate. 23 Because this was a suit for breach of a policy
provision as opposed to a breach of the policy itself, the court affirmed the
trial court's award of damages in excess of those set out in the policy.'
24
Further, the court reversed the trial court on the issue of prejudgment in-
terest.' 25 The court awarded the insured interest on those of his damages
that were complete at a definite time with the amount determined by fixed
rules of evidence and known standards of value.1
26
In Northern Assurance Co. v. Stan-Ann Oil Co. 127 the insured attempted
to increase coverage by means of the doctrines of waiver or estoppel. Stan-
Ann Oil held a $75,000 "monthly reporting form" fire insurance policy
with Northern Assurance. The policy required the insured to report to the
insurer in writing not later than thirty days after the last day of each calen-
dar month the total actual cash value of the insured property on the last
day of each calendar month. 28 For several months prior to the fire, the
119. 597 S.W.2d at 344.
120. 588 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
121. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fraiman, 514 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
122. 588 S.W.2d at 685.
123. Id. at 683; see Owens v. Withee, 3 Tex. 161 (1848); Brown v. Eubank, 443 S.W.2d
386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ).
124. 588 S.W.2d at 683.
125. Id. at 685.
126. Id. at 684-85; see Statler Hotels v. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 351 S.W.2d
579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ refd n.r.e.). In considering the award of interest, the
court added that it must determine if the insurer retained monies that should have been paid
to the insured but were not paid due to the insurer's wrongful breach of the policy provision.
588 S.W.2d at 684; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.
1978).
127. 603 S:W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
128. The value reporting clause in the policy stated:
It is a condition of this policy that the Insured shall report in writing to this
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insured had been delinquent in making monthly reports. The insurance
company had accepted all these delinquent monthly reports with the ex-
ception of the monthly report made after the fire. The last monthly report
by the insured was filed on March 4, 1975, at which time the total value
shown was $52,600. The insured, however, omitted from that report cer-
tain additional property with an actual cash value of $33,670.12. A fire
occurred on April 27, 1975, resulting in a loss of over $88,000 to the in-
sured. Upon proper proof of loss, the insurer paid $53,970.60, based on
the applicable ratio under the full reporting clause of the policy. 29 The
insured accepted the tendered amount under protest and thereafter sued to
recover the balance of its alleged damages. The trial court granted judg-
ment against the insurer and found that by accepting the late notices, it
was estopped to deny coverage.130
On appeal, the court recognized that an insurer can be estopped by its
conduct from seeking forfeiture of a policy. 131 The court added, however,
that neither the insurer's coverage nor restrictions on such coverage may
be extended or increased by the doctrines of waiver or estoppel. 132 The
court emphasized that the full reporting clause and the value reporting
clause contained in the policy concerned the coverage of the policy rather
Company not later than 30 days after the last day of each calendar month, the
exact location of all property covered hereunder, the total actual cash value of
such property at each location and all specific insurance in force at each of
such locations on the last day of each calendar month. At the time of any loss,
if the Insured has failed to file with this Company reports of values as above
required, this policy, subject otherwise to all its terms and conditions, shall
cover only at the locations and for not more than the amounts included in the
last report of values less the amount of specific insurance reported, if any, filed
prior to the loss, and further, if such delinquent report is the first report of
values herein required to be filed, this policy shall cover only at the respective
locations specifically named herein and for not exceeding 75% of the applica-
ble limit of liability of this Company specified in the Limit of Liability Clause.
If the inception date of this policy is the last day of the calendar month, then
the first report of values due shall show the total actual cash value(s) as of that
date.
Id. at 221.
129. The full reporting clause stated:
Liability under this policy shall not in any case exceed that proportion of
loss (meaning the loss as provided in the Excess Clause at the location in-
volved), which the last reported value filed prior to the loss, less the amount of
specific insurance reported, if any, at the location where any loss occurs bears
to the total actual cash value less the amount of specific insurance, if any, at
that location on the date for which report is made. Liability for loss hereun-
der, occurring at any location acquired since filing the last report (except as
provided by the Value Reporting Clause) shall be apportioned in a like man-
ner except that the proportion used shall be the relation that values reported at
all locations less the amount of reported specific insurance, if any, bear to the
total actual cash values less the amount of specific insurance, if any, at all
locations on the date for which report is made.
Id. at 222.
130. Id. at 221.
131. Id. at 223.
132. 1d; see Finger v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 423 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 335
S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd).
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than the grounds for its forfeiture. 33 The court concluded, therefore, that
the insurance company could not use the late reporting to declare the pol-
icy forfeited, but could limit liability or coverage to the last report filed
under the monthly reporting clause.' 34
In Port Arthur Towing Co. v. Mission Insurance Co.' 35 the Fifth Circuit
ventured into a previously unexplored area of Texas law. On December
31, 1973, Port Arthur Towing obtained a policy of insurance from Mission
Insurance. The policy contained a provision limiting the time for com-
mencement of actions due to vessel damage to the longer of one year or the
time permitted by the shortest statute of limitations. 36 On December 3,
1976, Port Arthur brought suit on the policy for the grounding of a vessel
that had occurred on June 12, 1974. The insurer filed a motion for dismis-
sal and, in the alternative, for summary judgment, claiming that the action
was barred by the policy limitations provision. The trial court denied this
motion and the insurer appealed.
It was undisputed that the twelve-month period provided by the policy
was void under the laws of the State of Texas. 137 The appellate court was
thus forced to determine whether the action had been "commenced within
the shortest limit of time permitted" by Texas law.' 38 The question arose
whether the four-year statute of limitations 139 should apply, or whether the
court should apply the shortest time available, the general two-year statute
of limitations. 140 The court distinguished the instant situation from that in
American Surety Co. v. Blaine.'4' In Blaine the policy provided that if the
policy limitations provision was void, then the statutory provision ap-
plied.' 42 The Blaine court stated that the policy reference to a "specific
133. 603 S.W.2d at 223.
134. Id.
135. 623 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1980).
136. The policy provided the following limitation on actions to recover under the policy:
It is a condition of this policy that no suit, action, or proceeding for the recov-
ery of any claim for physical loss of or damage to the vessel named herein
shall be maintainable in any court of law or equity unless the same be com-
menced within twelve (12) months next after the calendar date of the physical
loss or damage out of which the said claim arose. Provided, however, that if,
by the laws of the state within which this policy is issued such limitation is
invalid, then any such claim shall be void unless such action, suit or proceed-
ing be commenced within the shortest limit of time permitted by the laws of
such state, to be fixed herein.
Id. at 368.
137. Id. at 369; see National Military Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 379 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964, no writ).
138. See note 136 supra.
139. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) (applies to any
action for debt, certain actions on bonds to convey real estate, and certain actions by one
partner against a co-partner).
140. Id. art. 5545 (Vernon 1958) (invalidates any agreement providing for a limitations
period of less than two years).
141. 272 S.W. 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1925), wril refd n.r.e per curiam, 115
Tex. 147, 277 S.W. 619 (1928).
142. The policy provision in Blaine read as follows:
If any limitation of time . . . for any legal proceeding herein contained is at
variance with any specific statutory provision in relation thereto, in force in
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statutory period" referred to the four-year statute of limitations. 143 In the
instant policy, however, there was no specific mention of a statutory provi-
sion. For that reason, the Port Arthur court concluded that the parties
clearly intended for the shortest statute of limitations to apply. 44 The
court therefore held that the two-year statute of limitations should apply to
bar Port Arthur's claim.' 45
In dissent Justice Fay argued that because the policy provision was void,
the parties should not be allowed to contract in contravention of the stat-
ute. He opined that once the contract provision was declared void, the
applicable four-year statute of limitations should apply.' 46
III. LIFE, HEALTH, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Misrepresentations. In Mayes v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. 147 the court faced the question of the validity of a life insurance policy
when the physical condition of the insured changed for the worse between
the time of his application and the time of the issuance of the policy. Mas-
sachusetts Mutual sought a declaratory judgment action against the benefi-
ciary on two contracts of life insurance. The insured signed an application
for life insurance in which he indicated no material conditions affecting his
health. Before the policies were issued, however, the insured experienced
material conditions affecting his health, yet he did not relate this informa-
tion to the insurer. The jury answered the special issues generally in the
insurer's favor. However, the jury failed to find that the insured's failure
to disclose changes in his health was for the purpose of inducing the issu-
ance of the policy. For that reason, the trial court rendered judgment for
the beneficiary.
The court of civil appeals reversed and held that the issue of fraudulent
intent was not decisive.' 48 To the court of civil appeals, the controlling
point was the written condition precedent to the policy, the application.149
the state in which the premises of the assured as herein described are located,
such specific statutory provisions shall supersede any condition in this contract
inconsistent therewith.
272 S.W. at 829.
143. Id.
144. 623 F.2d at 370.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 371.
147. 608 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1980).
148. 592 S.W.2d 393, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979).
149. Id. at 395. The pertinent statements in the application were the insured's answers to
certain questions:
4. During the past five years, have you had:
A. Advice from or attendance or treatment by physicians, other practi-
tioners or psychologists?
Answer: Yes. ...
B. Treatment or observation in a hospital or sanitarium?
Answer: No.
C. X-ray, electrocardiographic or blood examinations?
Answer: No.
5. At any time have you been treated for or had any known indication of:
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The court reasoned that because of a misrepresentation on the application,
a condition precedent to the policy was not fulfilled, and, therefore, the
policy never became effective.' 50 In so holding, the court of civil appeals
followed those authorities that give controlling effect to contractual provi-
sions that a policy will not take effect unless it is delivered when the in-
sured is in good health. 15'
In reversing, the supreme court found that the signature section of the
application was not in the nature of a condition precedent.152 The court
did find, however, that the failure of the insured to advise the insurer of
the changes in his prior answers was a misrepresentation.1 53 Nevertheless,
because the insurer failed to establish an intentional deception, the court
held that the insurer failed in its defense of misrepresentation.1 54
Coverage. In L!fe Insurance Co. v. Overstreet155 the supreme court was
faced with a determination of the effective date of a life insurance policy.
The insurer issued a policy covering the life of Maxie Overstreet with an
effective date of March 15, 1972. On April 13, 1972, a check was issued by
Overstreet for the premium. The insurance company received the check
on April 17 and applied it on April 18, 1972. By April 15, 1973, Overstreet
had not paid the second year's premiums, and the policy was terminated
by the insurance carrier. Payment was made on April 25, 1973, however,
and the policy was reinstated. Maxie Overstreet died on April 24, 1974, at
which time the 1974 premium had not been paid.
The insurance company refused to pay the proceeds of the policy, stat-
ing that the policy's effective date was March 15. Because Overstreet's
death occurred after the thirty-one-day grace period, the insurer contended
that the policy had terminated. Mrs. Overstreet argued that the effective
date of the policy was April 18, the date of the premium payment, rather
A. A disorder of the heart, blood vessels, blood or glands?
Answer: No.
6. During the past five years, have you had any known indication of:




151. See, e.g., Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mayberry, 162 Tex. 492, 347 S.W.2d 598
(1961); Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. DUllard, 158 Tex. 15, 307 S.W.2d 242 (1957); Great Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Hulme, 134 Tex. 539, 136 S.W.2d 602 (1940).
152. 608 S.W.2d at 616.
153. Id.
154. Id. The court stated:
It is now settled law in this state that these five elements must be pled and
proved before the insurer may avoid a policy because of the misrepresentation
of the insured: (1) the making of the representation; (2) the falsity of the rep-
resentation; (3) reliance thereon by the insurer; (4) the intent to deceive on the
part of the insured in making same; and (5) the materiality of the representa-
tion.
155. 603 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1980).
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than March 15. Both the trial court and the court of civil appeals 156 agreed
with Mrs. Overstreet.
The supreme court in reversing, however, concluded that the effective
date of the policy was March 15.157 The court recognized that earlier
Texas decisions 158 had adopted the majority rule that a definite statement
in the policy of the date on which the annual premiums will be due is the
effective date. 159 The court explained:
Such a statement of the due date controls even over a provision
stating that a policy will not be in force until it is initially delivered
and the first premium is paid during the good health of the insured.
Once the policy comes in force, all of the terms of the policy become
operative including its provision about the "Effective Date."' 60
Because the policy fixed March 15, 1972, as the effective date, the policy
had lapsed prior to Overstreet's death and the court denied recovery to the
beneficiaries. 161
In Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 162 the supreme court decided a
question involving the election of remedies between a claim made for
health insurance benefits and a claim for workers' compensation benefits
as a result of the same condition. Bocanegra was hospitalized for back
injuries while employed by the Clegg Company. During her hospitaliza-
tion, she filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits alleging an occu-
pational disease. The workers' compensation carrier initially disputed
liability but later settled the claim. Bocanegra then filed this action against
Aetna for her medical expenses under a group policy held by her em-
ployer, alleging that her injury was nonoccupational. The trial court
granted judgment in her favor.
The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judg-
ment against Bocanegra.163 The court held that because Bocanegra recov-
ered workers' compensation benefits on the ground that her injury
occurred in the course of her employment, the doctrine of election of reme-
dies precluded recovery of medical expenses for the same condition under
an allegation of nonoccupational disease and injury.164 In upholding Bo-
canegra's right to pursue this claim, the supreme court distinguished elec-
tion of remedies from judicial estoppel, 165 equitable estoppel, 166
156. 580 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979). For a discussion of the court
of civil appeals' opinion, see Krebs, supra note 16, at 307-08.
157. 603 S.W.2d at 783.
158. See Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Vela, 147 Tex. 478, 217 S.W.2d 660 (1949); Great S.
Life Ins. Co. v. Peddy, 139 Tex. 245, 162 S.W.2d 652 (1942); Kurth v. National Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 79 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935, writ ref'd).
159. 603 S.W.2d at 782.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 783.
162. 605 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1980).
163. 572 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979). For a discussion of the court
of civil appeals' opinion, see Krebs, supra note 16, at 309-10.
164. 572 S.W.2d at 356.
165. See Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1971); Long v. Knox,
155 Tex. 581, 291 S.W.2d 292 (1956).
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ratification,1 67 waiver, 168 and satisfaction.169 The court noted that an elec-
tion may bar relief if one successfully exercises an informed choice be-
tween two or more remedies, rights, or fact situations that are so
inconsistent as to constitute manifest injustice. 170 The court found that the
requirements for an effective election were not present in the instant
case. 17' The initial treating physician told Bocanegra that her condition
was related to her employment. Upon a subsequent examination, how-
ever, she was informed that it was not employment-related. The court
concluded that the small amount of her settlement was due to the varying
reports concerning her disease. 172 Because of the uncertain nature of her
claim, the court reasoned that her settlement with the compensation carrier
did not give rise to the informed election of remedies 73 that should oper-
ate to bar a second action for damages.
IV. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND THE INSURANCE CODE
In Jay Freeman Co. v. Glens Falls Insurance Co. 174 suit was brought in
federal district court for numerous alleged violations of the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act 175 and for recovery of at-
torneys' fees under the Texas Insurance Code.' 76 The insurance company
had issued a boiler and machinery policy to the plaintiff. One of the plain-
tiff's food freezers failed, resulting in thawing and the loss of a substantial
amount of frozen food. The insurance company conceded that the policy
provided coverage, but maintained that it was excused from liability by the
failure of the insured to use due diligence to protect itself from loss subse-
quent to the accident. The plaintiff brought suit alleging violations of four
sections of the Act 177 due to the insurance company's denial of liability as
well as its representations that the policy provided coverage for certain
losses.
The court held that section 17.46(b)(7), providing that it is a deceptive
trade practice to represent that goods and services are of a particular quali-
ty, standard grade, style, or model, if in fact they are not, was not applica-
166. See Barfield v. Howard M. Smith Co., 426 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. 1968); Concord Oil Co.
v. Alco Oil & Gas Corp., 387 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1965); Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252
S.W.2d 929 (1952).
167. See Texas & Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Kirtley, 288 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1926, writ ref'd).
168. See Ford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1977).
169. See James & Co. v. Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1977); McMillen v. Klingen-
smith, 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971); Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703
(1935).
170. 605 S.W.2d at 851.
171. Id. at 853.
172. Id. at 854.
173. Id.
174. 486 F. Supp. 140 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
175. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
176. TEx. INS. CODE ANrN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1963).
177. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46(b)(7), (12), (19), .50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981).
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ble. 178 The court stated that an insurance policy is neither "goods" nor
"services" in light of the fact that section 17.46(b)(12) proscribes similar
conduct with regard to contractual rights.' 79 It was thus apparent to the
court that section 17.46(b)(7) did not include such intangible contract
rights as those conferred by insurance policies.' 80
The court further held that section 17.46(b)(12), making it a deceptive
trade practice to represent that an agreement confers or involves rights,
remedies, or obligations that it lacks, was not violated.' 8' The court held
that a mere denial of liability under a policy cannot create a claim for
treble damages.'8 2 Further, although the insured alleged that the policy
contained an implied warranty of its benefits and of the company's obliga-
tion to the insured, because section 17.46(b)(12) speaks only in terms of
representations, the court stated that it does not apply to implied warran-
ties. 183
The court also found inapplicable section 17.46(b)(19), which makes it a
deceptive trade practice to represent that a guarantee or warranty confers
or involves rights or remedies that it does not have or involve. 184 This
section applies to representations about warranties rather than to ordinary
representations about, or warranties or guarantees of the goods or services
themselves. 85 Therefore, the court ruled that this section did not apply
because there were here no misrepresentations concerning warranties or
guarantees. 186
Lastly, section 17.50(a)(2), making it a deceptive trade practice to breach
an express or implied warranty, was likewise held to be inapplicable to this
situation. 8 7 The court stated that the alleged implied warranty of policy
benefits and obligations added nothing to the benefits and obligations of
the insurance contract because the policy terms speak for themselves. 88
Hence, the court reasoned that there was no implied warranty of benefits
or obligations that was not already contained in the contract, and the court
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under this provision.' 8 9
The court was presented with a more difficult question in determining
whether article 3.62 of the Insurance Code, regarding the recovery of rea-
sonable attorneys' fees, was applicable.1 90 The court stated that its deci-




182. Id; see Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979);
Lone Star Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
183. 486 F. Supp. at 143.
184. Id.
185. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(19) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).




190. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1963) provides:
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sion turned on whether the policy was an accident policy. 191 Although
Texas authorities on this question are conflicting, 92 the court ultimately
determined that because the portion of the policy in question covering
property damage was a part of a liability policy, the policy was not an
accident policy. 193 Consequently, the court held that the claim was not
governed by article 3.62.194 The court also denied the plaintiff attorneys'
fees under article 2226,195 the general attorneys' fees statute, because this
statute is specifically made inapplicable to contracts issued by insurers sub-
ject to certain provisions of the Texas Insurance Code. 196
Hi-Line Electric Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co. 197 similarly involved an
interpretation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Insurance
Code. Hi-Line's vehicle was involved in an accident with a Travelers' in-
sured. Hi-Line alleged that after the accident Travelers agreed to pay for
certain repairs, rental of another truck, and other related expenses, and
made recommendations regarding repairs and rentals. Hi-Line further al-
leged that it was forced to pay the repairs and rental costs when Travelers
refused to do so. Thus, Hi-Line argued that Travelers agreed to pay with-
out intending to do so in violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
The question before the court was whether Hi-Line had a cause of ac-
tion under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act when the services and leased
items were sought and obtained from a third party.' 98 The court agreed
with Travelers' contention that the consumer must seek or acquire goods
or services from the person being sued. 199 Further, the court concluded
that the Deceptive Trade Practices Act was not intended to cover situations
where the defendant did not sell, lease, offer, or advertise to sell or lease to
In all cases where a loss occurs and the life insurance company, or accident
insurance company, or life and accident, health and accident, or life, health
and accident insurance company liable therefor shall fail to pay the same
within thirty days after demand therefor, such company shall be liable to pay
the holder of such policy, in addition to the amount of the loss, twelve (12%)
per cent damages on the amount of such loss together with reasonable attor-
ney fees for the prosecution and collection of such loss. Such attorney fee
shall be taxed as a part of the costs in the case. The Court in fixing such fees
shall take into consideration all benefits to the insured incident to the prosecu-
tion of the suit, accrued and to accrue on account of such policy.
191. 486 F. Supp. at 143.
192. Compare Bybee v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 160 Tex. 429, 331 S.W.2d 910 (1960)
(policy covering hail damage to crops held not an accident policy) and Evans v. Pacific
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 367 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, wnt retd n.r.e.) (fire insur-
ance policy held not an accident policy) with National Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Gomillion, 178
S.W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, writ ref'd) (policy covering a mule held an acci-
dent policy).
193. 486 F. Supp. at 144.
194. Id.
195. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
196. 486 F. Supp. at 144.
197. 587 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), writ reftd n.r.e per curiam, 593
S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1980).
198. 587 S.W.2d at 489.
199. Id. at 490. The court ruled that although the plaintiff and defendant need not be in
privity or in a contractual relationship, the consumer must seek or acquire goods or services




The court also held that Hi-Line was not entitled to recover under either
article 21.21 or article 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code.20' Article 21.21-
2202 provides remedies for injuries suffered as a result of unfair claims set-
tlement practices, but does not confer a right of action upon the individual
injured by an unfair settlement practice. 20 3 Instead, the State Board of
Insurance is empowered to stop an unfair or unlawful practice by means of
a cease and desist order.2°4 Thus the court ruled that plaintiff had no
cause of action under article 21.21-2.205
With regard to article 21.21, the court held that an individual may re-
cover thereunder only if that individual could recover under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. 20 6 Because Hi-Line was not a consumer under the
Act, the court held that it was not entitled to recover pursuant to article
21.21.207
In a per curiam opinion the supreme court refused the writ of error,
finding no reversible error.20 8 The court cautioned, however, that its ac-
tion should not be interpreted as approving the court of civil appeals' hold-
ing that a private action under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code must be
based on the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 20 9 The court further stated
that it was not approving the position of the court of civil appeals that a
person, as that term is used in article 21.21, section 16(a), must be a con-
sumer as defined in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 210 Thus, these two
elements of the lower court's opinion remain unsettled points of law.
In McNeill v. McDavid Insurance Agency 21' an insurance applicant
brought suit alleging that he was misled to believe that he had liability
coverage when in fact he only had property damage coverage. McNeill
purchased a car from Bill McDavid Pontiac, and, as a condition to financ-
ing, the financing institution required that McNeill have property damage
insurance. He obtained such coverage through the McDavid agency,
which is associated with the car dealership. This agency solicits automo-
bile insurance policies and applications for policies and submits them to
various companies for acceptance. A soliciting agent for the McDavid
agency met with McNeill, and an application form entitled "Automobile
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980).
203. See Lone Star Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 574 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
204. See Russell v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
205. 587 S.W.2d at 490.
206. Id.; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1980),
which provides that any person injured by another engaging in any deceptive trade practice
may maintain an action against the company or companies engaged in such practice.
207. 587 S.W.2d at 491.
208. 593 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1980).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 594 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
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Liability and Physical Damage Insurance Application" was completed.
The application did not include a request for liability coverage, as no pre-
mium charge was entered in the space providing for such coverage. After
the application was completed, but prior to the issuance of the insurance
policy by Vico County Mutual, McNeill was involved in an accident that
resulted in a judgment against him for damages to the other vehicle in-
volved in the accident. Vico honored the property damage portion of the
policy and paid for the collision loss.
In this subsequent suit alleging deceptive trade practices, McNeill ar-
gued that the McDavid agency misled him to believe that he had liability
coverage, coverage that he would have secured had he known it was not
included in his policy. He did not allege any oral misrepresentation by the
soliciting agent. Rather, he contended that because he requested liability
coverage and saw a reference to such coverage in the title of the applica-
tion form, and because he was not informed of the terms of the application
or what coverages were included, he justifiably and detrimentally relied on
the agent to apply for liability coverage. He thus argued that the agency
violated article 21.21, sections 4(1) and (2), of the Texas Insurance
Code,212 which constituted a deceptive trade practice under section
17.50(a)(4) of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.2 13
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants as a matter of law,
212. Sections 4(1) and 4(2) of art. 21.21 of the Insurance Code provide:
Sec. 4. Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices Defined.-The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of
competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insur-
ance:
(1) Misrepresentations and False Advertising of Policy Contracts. Mak-
ing, issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, issued or circulated, any esti-
mate, illustration, circular or statement misrepresenting the terms of any
policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised thereby or
the dividends or share of the surplus to be received thereon, or making any
false or misleading statements as to the dividends or share of surplus previ-
ously paid on simi ar policies, or making any misleading representation or any
misrepresentation as to the financial condition of any insurer, or as to the legal
reserve system upon which any life insurer operates, or using any name or title
of any policy or class of policies misrepresenting the true nature thereof, or
making any misrepresentation to any policyholder insured in any company for
the purpose of inducing or tending to induce such policyholder to lapse, for-
feit, or surrender his insurance;
(2) False Information and Advertising Generally. Making, publishing,
disseminating, circulating or placing before the public, or causing, directly or
indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before
the public, in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the form of a
notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster, or over any radio or television sta-
tion, or in any other way, an advertisement, announcement or statement con-
taining any assertion, representation or statement with respect to the business
of insurance or with respect to any person in the conduct of his insurance
business, which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, §§ 4(1)-(2) (Vernon 1963).
213. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) grants a
cause of action to consumers injured by an act or practice in violation of art. 21.21 of the
Texas Insurance Code.
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and the court of civil appeals affirmed. 214 The court of appeals stated that
it was beyond dispute that there were no oral misrepresentations and that
the soliciting agent did not explain what coverages were sought. 215 The
court further noted that explanations on the face of the policy clearly indi-
cated that coverages existed only for items for which premium charges
were made.216 Accordingly, the court held that there was no misrepresen-
tation or false advertising as proscribed by article 21.21, section 4(1) of the
Insurance Code, 217 which prohibits misrepresentations as to a policy that
is issued or about to be issued. The court viewed the application as a mere
offer to purchase insurance rather than as a guarantee of coverage. 218 As
the application could not be construed as a policy to which section 4(1)
applies, the court could find no violation of this section. 219
McNeill also contended that because he specifically requested liability
coverage and used an application form referring to liability coverage, the
agent's failure to inform him that he was not receiving such coverage was a
deceptive trade practice. The court found no provision in the Texas Insur-
ance Code, article 21.21, by which such a failure could be construed as a
deceptive trade practice. 220 Because an insurance policy is viewed as a
service under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 221 however, the court as-
sumed, without deciding, that section 17.46(b)(23) 222 would govern. 223
That section defines a deceptive trade practice as the failure to disclose
information concerning goods or services that was known at the time of
the transaction if such failure to disclose was intended to induce the con-
sumer into a transaction he otherwise would not have entered. 224 The
court found the critical question to be whether the solicitor was an agent of
the applicant or of the insurer, for it is the agency relationship that creates
a duty to inform. 225 The court noted that McNeill never asserted that the
soliciting agent was his agent;226 rather, McNeill contended throughout
that the solicitor was the agent of the McDavid agency and the insurance
company.227 The court stated that because the soliciting agent was not an
agent of McNeill, the agent had no legal duty to prevent McNeill from
214. 594 S.W.2d at 200.
215. Id. at 201.
216. The coverage page on the front of the insurance application stated: "The insurance
afforded is only with respect to such of the following coverages as are indicated by specific
premium charge or charges. The limit of the company's liability against each such coverage
shall be as stated herein, subject to all the terms of this policy having reference thereto." Id.




221. See Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
222. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
223. 594 S.W.2d at 202.
224. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
225. 594 S.W.2d at 203; see Burroughs v. Bunch, 210 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1948, writ refd).




being self-deceived. 228 Lastly, the court ruled that the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act would not have applied to Vico County Mutual even if there
had been a deceptive trade practice, because the act does not apply to
county mutual insurance companies. 229
In Legal Security Life Insurance Co. v. Trevino230 the court decided a
venue question in a suit against an insurer for an alleged deceptive trade
practice. The insurance company had appointed Jesse Sanchez as a solicit-
ing agent. The plaintiffs petition alleged that Sanchez had called upon
him in Frio County to solicit an application for a hospitalization insurance
policy. The plaintiff further alleged that Sanchez represented that the pol-
icy would take immediate effect. Trevino's son was injured shortly there-
after, and the insurance company refused to honor Trevino's claim for
medical expenses. Trevino brought suit in Frio County for a deceptive
trade practice under section 17.50.231
The question before the court was whether the insurance company had
done business in Frio County.232 The court held that because Sanchez was
appointed as an agent for the purpose of soliciting insurance and did so-
licit insurance in Frio County, the company had done business in that
county for the purpose of maintaining venue under section 17.56.233 The
court further held that a cause of action had been alleged as necessary
under section 17.56.234 Lastly, the court held that the plaintiff's allegation
that Sanchez made the representation while in the course and scope of his
employment was sufficient for the purpose of maintaining venue. 235
On appeal, the supreme court in a per curiam opinion refused the writ of
error, finding no reversible error.236 The court held that the single transac-
tion that was the basis of the suit had occurred in the county of the suit
and, therefore, the defendant had done business in that county. The court
noted 237 that this holding conflicted with the Dallas court of civil appeals'
decision in Moore v. While.238 While the court did not expressly overrule
Moore, the holding of that case has apparently been disapproved by Tre-
vino.
.228. Id.
229. Id; see Mobil County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903, 909-10 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
230. 594 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979), writ refdn.r.e. per curiam, 605
S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980).
231. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
232. Id. § 17.56. As originally written this section provided for venue in a county in
which the person against whom suit is brought was "doing business." See 1973 Tex. Gen.
Laws, ch. 143, § I, at 331. It was amended in 1977 to use the term "has done business." See
1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, § 8, at 604. Although this section was amended again in 1979,
the instant case was governed by the 1977 version.
233. 594 S.W.2d at 483.
234. Id. at 484.
235. Id. at 483-84.
236. 605 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1980).
237. Id.
238. 587 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ). In that case the court held
that an isolated sale of one house in the county was not evidence that the defendant "has
done business" in the county. Id. at 550.
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